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Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game

Listed author(s):
  • Sun, Ning

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Trockel, Walter

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Yang, Zaifu

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Registered author(s):

    In this paper we study competitve outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory. For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the game. First, it is shown that the full core of a TU game is not empty if and only if the completion of the game is balanced. The full core is defined free of any particular coalition structure and the coalitions of the game emerge endogenously from the full core. Second, it is shown that the full core of a completion-balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy and that the coalition structures of the game are endogenously determined by the equilibrium outcomes of the economy. As a consequence, the core of a balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy.

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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315412/2319785
    File Function: First Version, 2004
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University in its series Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers with number 358.

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    Date of creation: 12 Aug 2011
    Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:358
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    Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/

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    1. Walter Trockel, 2002. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(1), pages 27-43.
    2. Ray, Indrajit & Zhou, Lin, 2001. "Game Theory via Revealed Preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 415-424, November.
    3. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521555838 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Brams,Steven J. & Taylor,Alan D., 1996. "Fair Division," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521556446.
    5. Sandler,Todd, 2001. "Economic Concepts for the Social Sciences," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521792622.
    6. Rosenmueller,J. & Trockel,W., 2001. "Game theory," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 321, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
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