IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game

  • Sun,N.
  • Trockel,W.

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Yang,Z.

We extend the analysis of competitive outcomes in TU market games of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1975. Competitive outcomes in the cores of market games. International Journal of Game Theory 4, 229-237] in two ways. First, our representing economies are coalition production economies. Second, and more importantly, our analysis holds for arbitrary TU games. By adopting the C-stable set of Guesnerie and Oddou [Guesnerie, R., Oddou, C., 1979. On economic games which are not necessarily superadditive. Economics Letters 3, 301-306], renamed c-core in our paper, we are able to characterize competitive outcomes even in games with empty core. As competitive outcomes are associated with specific coalition structures, our main result provides an endogenous determination of coalition building and shows that the c-core of any TU game coincides with the set of competitive outcomes of the corresponding coalition production economy.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University in its series Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers with number 358.

in new window

Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:358
Contact details of provider: Postal: Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld
Phone: +49(0)521-106-4907
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Billera, Louis J., 1974. "On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 129-139, August.
  2. Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Sondermann, Dieter, 1974. "Economies of scale and equilibria in coalition production economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 259-291, July.
  4. Guesnerie, Roger & Oddou, Claude, 1981. "Second best taxation as a game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 67-91, August.
  5. L. W. McKenzie, 2010. "The Classical Theorem on Existence of Competitive Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1388, David K. Levine.
  6. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
  7. Rosenmueller,J. & Trockel,W., 2001. "Game theory," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 321, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  8. Indrajit Ray & Lin Zhou, . "Game Theory Via Revealed Preferences," Discussion Papers 00/15, Department of Economics, University of York.
  9. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521555838 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Gabrielle Demange, 2005. "Group formation: The interaction of increasing returns and preferences' diversity," Post-Print halshs-00573563, HAL.
  11. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "A Walrasian approach to bargaining games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 295-301, June.
  12. Neuefeind, Wilhelm, 1974. "A stochastic bargaining process for n-person games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 175-191, August.
  13. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
  14. Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May.
  15. Anderson, Robert M, 1978. "An Elementary Core Equivalence Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1483-87, November.
  16. Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro, 1881. "Mathematical Psychics," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number edgeworth1881.
  17. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521792622 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1993. "A Conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of NTU Market Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 335-44.
  19. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521556446 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521796774 is not listed on IDEAS
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:358. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bettina Weingarten)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.