Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game
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|Date of creation:||2004|
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- Sandler,Todd, 2001.
"Economic Concepts for the Social Sciences,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521792622, December.
- Indrajit Ray & Lin Zhou, "undated".
"Game Theory Via Revealed Preferences,"
00/15, Department of Economics, University of York.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521555838 is not listed on IDEAS
- Rosenmueller,J. & Trockel,W., 2001. "Game theory," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 321, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Walter Trockel, 2002. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(1), pages 27-43.
- Brams,Steven J. & Taylor,Alan D., 1996. "Fair Division," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521556446, December.
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