Group formation: The interaction of increasing returns and preferences' diversity
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on competition in a simple economy under increasing returns to scale and heterogeneous consumers. The concept of sustainable oligopoly is discussed and analyzed. Section 3 studies in a more general and abstract set up competition among groups in the absence of spillovers. Whereas Section 3 develops some insights of Section 2, it can be read first. Finally Section 4 analyzes public decisions in a simple public good economy through the previous approach, and addresses the interaction between free mobility and free entry under negative externalities.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Publication status:||Published in Gabrielle Demange ; Myrna Wooders. Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs and Coalitions, Cambridge University Press, pp.171-208, 2005|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00573563|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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