Club Formation Games with Farsighted Agents
Modeling club structures as bipartite networks, we formulate the problem of club formation as a game of network formation and identify those club networks that are stable if agents behave farsightedly in choosing their club memberships. Using the farsighted core as our stability notion, we show that if agents' payoffs are single-peaked and agents agree on the peak club size (i.e., agents agree on the optimal club size) and if there sufficiently many clubs to allow for the partition of agents into clubs of optimal size, then a necessary and sufficient condition for the farsighted core to be nonempty is that agents who end up in smaller-than-optimal size clubs have no incentive to switch their memberships to already existing clubs of optimal size. In contrast, we show via an example that if there are too few clubs relative to the number of agents, then the farsighted core may be empty. Contrary to prior results in the literature involving myopic behavior, our example shows that overcrowding and farsightedness lead to instability in club formation.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2005|
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- Conley, John P. & Konishi, Hideo, 2002.
"Migration-proof Tiebout equilibrium: existence and asymptotic efficiency,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 243-262, November.
- John Conley & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Migration-proof Tiebout equilibrium:Existence and asymptotic efficiency," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(1), pages 1.
- John P. Conley & Hideo Konishi, 2000. "Migration-Proof Tiebout Equilibrium: Existence and Asymptotic Efficiency," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 452, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 01 Dec 2000.
- Gabrielle Demange & Wooders Myrna, 2005. "Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs and Coalitions," Post-Print halshs-00576778, HAL. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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