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Farsightedly stable networks

Author

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  • HERINGS, Jean-Jacques
  • MAULEON, Ana
  • VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent

Abstract

We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairto a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well wise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g G

Suggested Citation

  • HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2006. "Farsightedly stable networks," CORE Discussion Papers 2006092, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2006092
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2004. "Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation Games with Positive Spillovers," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 291-324, May.
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    5. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2004. "Rationalizability for social environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 135-156, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    networks; farsighted; stability; pairwise; efficiency;

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General

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