The authors propose a solution concept--which they call viable proposals--for games in coalitional form that endogenously determines a coalition structure together with an associated set of payoff configurations as parts of the solution. They show that there is at least one viable proposal for every game; further, whenever a game has a nonempty core, the set of payoff configurations identified by the solution coincides with the core of the game. Finally, given any arbitrary coalition structure and payoff configuration, a viable proposal can be reached in finitely many steps of successive domination even when the core of the game is empty. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Volume (Year): 35 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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