IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Link formation in cooperative situations

  • Stef Tijs

    ()

    (Department of Econometrics and Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands)

  • Anne van den Nouweland

    ()

    (Department of Economics, 435 PLC, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, U.S.A.)

  • Bhaskar Dutta

    ()

    (Indian Statistical Institute, 7SJS Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi-110016, India)

In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of cooperation structure formation as a game in strategic form. It is shown that several equilibrium refinements predict the formation of the complete cooperation structure or some structure which is payoff-equivalent to the complete structure. These results are obtained for a large class of solutions for cooperative games with cooperation structures.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/8027002/80270245.pdf
Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 27 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 245-256

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:245-256
Note: Received September 1995/Revised version I October 1996/Revised version II April 1997/Final version September 1997
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

Order Information: Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:245-256. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)

or (Christopher F Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.