The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension
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- Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc, 2007. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 277-298, November.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2002. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(8), pages 1.
- KÃ³czy LÃ¡szlÃ³ Ã . & Lauwers Luc, 2004. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," Research Memorandum 018, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Laszlo A. Koczy & Luc Lauwers, 2004. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0421, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2003. "The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension," Working Papers 2003.50, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension," Game Theory and Information 0210002, EconWPA.
References listed on IDEAS
- Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1996. "A Property of the Core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 266-273, February.
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- Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc, 2004.
"The coalition structure core is accessible,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 86-93, July.
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2001. "The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible," Game Theory and Information 0110001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jun 2002.
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible," Working Papers Department of Economics ces0219, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Greenberg, Joseph, 1994. "Coalition structures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 37, pages 1305-1337 Elsevier.
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"An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations,"
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- Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Yang, Yi-You, 2010. "On the accessibility of the core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 194-199, May.
- Péter Szikora, 2013. "Introduction into the literature of cooperative game theory with special emphasis on dynamic games and the core," Proceedings- 11th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2013), Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- Gedai, Endre & Kóczy, László Á. & Zombori, Zita, 2012. "Cluster games: A novel, game theory-based approach to better understand incentives and stability in clusters," MPRA Paper 65095, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-04-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2008-04-12 (Game Theory)
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