Introduction into the literature of cooperative game theory with special emphasis on dynamic games and the core
Cooperative games model situations where the actors can collaborate, can form coalitions. There exist many static models, however models are too simplistic compared to our more complex world. Despite the fact that there have been several experimental studies on coalition formation there are only very few theoretical papers dealing with the problem in a dynamic context. These papers are not only few in number, but the presented concepts are poorly related. Present paper discusses the process of dynamic coalition formation, and gives a basic insight into the mainstream literature of the quest for finding the core
|This chapter was published in: Pál Michelberger (ed.) , , pages 273-280, 2013.|
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