Dynamic cooperative models of coalition formation and the core
Cooperative games model situations where the actors can collaborate, can form coalitions. We know many static models, but our world is more complex. Despite the fact that there have been several experimental studies on coalition formation there are only very few theoretical papers dealing with the problem in a dynamic context. These papers are not only few in number, but the presented concepts are poorly related. In this paper I discuss two approaches: I explain the process of dynamic coalition formation, and I look at and review a learning model. After it I show some paper about the core. The main aspect is how can reach the core.
|This chapter was published in: György Kadocsa (ed.) , , pages 291-296, 2012.|
|This item is provided by Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management in its series Proceedings- 10th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2012) with number 291-296.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1084 Budapest, Tavaszmezö u. 15-17|
Web page: http://www.kgk.uni-obuda.hu
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Yang, Yi-You, 2010. "On the accessibility of the core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 194-199, May.
- Feldman, Allan M, 1974. "Recontracting Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(1), pages 35-44, January.
- Agastya, Murali, 1999. "Perturbed Adaptive Dynamics in Coalition Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 207-233, December.
- Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1996. "A Property of the Core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 266-273, February.
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2001.
"The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible,"
Game Theory and Information
0110001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jun 2002.
- Konishi, Hideo & Ray, Debraj, 2003.
"Coalition formation as a dynamic process,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 1-41, May.
- Murali Agastia, "undated".
"Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations,"
ELSE working papers
007, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Murali Agastya, 1997. "Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 411-426.
- Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pkk:meb012:291-296. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Vécsey)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.