The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible
For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation - which we label outsider independent - is employed.
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- DIAMANTOUDI, Effrosyni & XUE, Licun, 2002.
"Coalitions, agreements and efficiency,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2002047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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- Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1994. "Viable Proposals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 347-59, May.
- Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1996. "A Property of the Core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 266-273, February.
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