Tanítás értelmezhetõ-e, mint egy kooperatív dinamikus játék?
Célom a dolgozattal bemutatni, hogy az oktatás értelmezhetõ kooperatív dinamikus játékként. Oktatásban a tanár és az hallgató is játékosként szerepel, koalicíókat hoznak létre a céljuk elérésének érdekében, és döntéseiket a többiek döntései meghatározzák, nem egymástól függetlenül választanak a cselekvési változatók közül.
|This chapter was published in: György Kadocsa (ed.) , , pages 379-386, 2011.|
|This item is provided by Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management in its series Proceedings- 9th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2011) with number 379-386.|
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