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Models of Thinking, Learning, and Teaching in Games

Author

Listed:
  • Colin Camerer
  • Teck Ho
  • Kuan Chong

Abstract

Noncooperative game theory combines strategic thinking, best-response, and mutual consistency of beliefs and choices (equilibrium). Hundreds of experiments show that in actual behavior these three forces are limited, even when subjects are highly motivated and analytically skilled (Camerer, 2003). The challenge is to create models that are as general, precise, and parsimonious as equilibrium, but which also use cognitive details to explain experimental evidence more accurately and to predict new regularities. This paper describes three exemplar models of behavior in one-shot games (thinking), learning over time, and how repeated "partner" matching affects behavior (teaching) (see Camerer et al., 2002b).

Suggested Citation

  • Colin Camerer & Teck Ho & Kuan Chong, 2003. "Models of Thinking, Learning, and Teaching in Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 192-195, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:2:p:192-195
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282803321947038
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898.
    2. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2001. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1402-1422, December.
    3. Timothy C. Salmon, 2001. "An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1597-1628, November.
    4. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
    5. Binmore, Ken, 1988. "Modeling Rational Players: Part II," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 9-55, April.
    6. Teck H Ho & Colin Camerer & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2003. "Functional EWA: A one-parameter theory of learning in games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000514, David K. Levine.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kocher, Martin & Strau[ss], Sabine & Sutter, Matthias, 2006. "Individual or team decision-making--Causes and consequences of self-selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 259-270, August.
    2. Lea, Stephen E.G. & Webley, Paul, 2005. "In search of the economic self," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 585-604, October.
    3. Ernst Fehr & John A. List, 2004. "The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives-Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOs," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 743-771, September.
    4. Katarina Kostelic, 2020. "Guessing the Game: An Individual’s Awareness and Assessment of a Game’s Existence," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 11(2), pages 1-28, March.
    5. Stefania Bortolotti & Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2009. "Exploring the effects of real effort in a weak-link experiment," CEEL Working Papers 0901, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    6. Trabelsi, Emna & Hichri, Walid, 2021. "Central Bank Transparency with (semi-)public Information: Laboratory Experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    7. Shachat, Jason & Swarthout, J. Todd, 2012. "Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 383-402.
    8. Ho, Teck H. & Camerer, Colin F. & Chong, Juin-Kuan, 2007. "Self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning in games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 177-198, March.
    9. Sonnemans, Joep & Tuinstra, Jan, 2010. "Positive expectations feedback experiments and number guessing games as models of financial markets," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 964-984, December.
    10. Asim Ansari & Ricardo Montoya & Oded Netzer, 2012. "Dynamic learning in behavioral games: A hidden Markov mixture of experts approach," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 475-503, December.
    11. Martin G. Kocher & Matthias Sutter, 2005. "The Decision Maker Matters: Individual Versus Group Behaviour in Experimental Beauty-Contest Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(500), pages 200-223, January.
    12. Szikora Péter, 2011. "Tanítás értelmezhetõ-e, mint egy kooperatív dinamikus játék?," Proceedings- 9th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2011),, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
    13. De Giorgi, Enrico & Reimann, Stefan, 2008. "The [alpha]-beauty contest: Choosing numbers, thinking intervals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 470-486, November.
    14. Martin G. Kocher & Matthias Sutter & Florian Wakolbinger, 2007. "The Impact of Naïve Advice and Observational Learning in Beauty-contest Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-015/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    15. Tigran Melkonyan & Hossam Zeitoun & Nick Chater, 2018. "Collusion in Bertrand vs. Cournot Competition: A Virtual Bargaining Approach," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(12), pages 5599-5610, December.
    16. repec:wyi:journl:002151 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Irene C. L. Ng & Lu‐Ming Tseng, 2008. "Learning to be Sociable: The Evolution of Homo Economicus," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 265-286, April.

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