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Dynamic coalition formation and the core

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  • Arnold, Tone
  • Schwalbe, Ulrich

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  • Arnold, Tone & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 2002. "Dynamic coalition formation and the core," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 363-380, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:49:y:2002:i:3:p:363-380
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rodney D. Ludema & Ian Wooton, 1994. "Cross-Border Externalities and Trade Liberalization: The Strategic Control of Pollution," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, pages 950-966.
    2. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    3. Murali Agastya, 1997. "Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 411-426.
    4. Agastya, Murali, 1999. "Perturbed Adaptive Dynamics in Coalition Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 207-233.
    5. Kalai, Ehud & Postlewaite, Andrew & Roberts, John, 1979. "A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 13-22.
    6. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 30-78.
    7. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 286-336.
    8. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 29-56.
    9. Arthur, W Brian, 1989. "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 116-131, March.
    10. Dieckmann, Tone, 1999. "The evolution of conventions with mobile players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 93-111.
    11. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    12. Allan M. Feldman, 1973. "Bilateral Trading Processes, Pairwise Optimally, and Pareto Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(4), pages 463-473.
    13. Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July.
    14. Siegfried Berninghaus & Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Claudia Keser, 1999. "Continuous-Time Strategy Selection in Linear Population Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, pages 41-57.
    15. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
    16. Greenberg, Joseph, 1994. "Coalition structures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 37, pages 1305-1337 Elsevier.
    17. Ehud Kalai, 1978. "A Group Incentive Compatible Mechanism Yielding Core Allocation," Discussion Papers 329, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    18. Ulrich Schwalbe & Siegfried K. Berninghaus, 1996. "Conventions, local interaction, and automata networks," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, pages 297-312.
    19. Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski & H. Peyton Young, 2013. "The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets," Working Papers 2013.50, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Lionel Perrier & Pascal Pommier & Marie-Odile Carrère & Patrick Sylvestre-Baron, 2008. "Les évaluations de coûts en santé sont-elles transférables ?," Post-Print halshs-00260873, HAL.
    3. Mohebbi, Shima & Li, Xueping, 2015. "Coalitional game theory approach to modeling suppliers' collaboration in supply networks," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, pages 333-342.
    4. Annelies de Ridder & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Elena Saiz & Eligius K.M. Hendrix, 2008. "Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility," Working Papers 0806, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    5. Newton, Jonathan, 2012. "Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 364-381.
    6. Arnold, Tone & Wooders, Myrna, 2002. "Dynamic Club Formation With Coordination," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 640, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    7. Rozen, Kareen, 2013. "Conflict leads to cooperation in demand bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 35-42.
    8. Kareen Rozen, 2008. "Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002086, David K. Levine.
    9. Heinrich Nax & Bary Pradelski, 2015. "Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 903-932.
    10. Inoue, Tomoki, 2012. "Representation of transferable utility games by coalition production economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 143-147.
    11. repec:spr:grdene:v:22:y:2013:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-011-9276-0 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Nax, Heinrich H. & Pradelski, Bary S. R., 2015. "Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65428, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Dávid Csercsik, 2016. "Competition and Cooperation in a Bidding Model of Electrical Energy Trade," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 1043-1073, December.
    14. Theodoridis, Konstantinos & Zanetti, Francesco, 2014. "News and labour market dynamics in the data and in matching models," Bank of England working papers 488, Bank of England.
    15. Seok, Hyesung & Nof, Shimon Y., 2014. "Dynamic coalition reformation for adaptive demand and capacity sharing," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, pages 136-146.
    16. Bhattacharya, Debopam, 2013. "Evaluating treatment protocols using data combination," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, pages 160-174.
    17. Neog, Rupok & Borkotokey, Surajit, 2011. "Dynamic resource allocation in fuzzy coalitions : a game theoretic model," MPRA Paper 40074, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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