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The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time

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  • Kevin Hasker
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4786969000000000954.pdf
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    Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 786969000000000954.

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    Date of creation: 24 Apr 2014
    Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000954
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    30. Fernando Vega Redondo, 1996. "The evolution of walrasian behavior," Working Papers. Serie AD 1996-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    31. Tanaka, Yasuhito, 2000. "Stochastically stable states in an oligopoly with differentiated goods: equivalence of price and quantity strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 235-253, October.
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    33. Cui, Zhiwei & Zhai, Jian, 2010. "Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1015-1029, November.
    34. Glenn Ellison, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45.
    35. Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2006. "Imitation processes with small mutations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 251-262, November.
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    41. Anke Gerber & Marc Bettzüge, 2007. "Evolutionary choice of markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(3), pages 453-472, March.
    42. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2006. "When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action," Economics Series Working Papers 269, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    43. Naidu, Suresh & Hwang, Sung-Ha & Bowles, Samuel, 2010. "Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 31-33, October.
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