General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
We consider a pure exchange economy, where for each good several trading institutions are available, only one of which is market-clearing. The other feasible trading institutions lead to rationing. To learn on which trading institutions to coordinate, traders follow behavioural rules of thumb that are based on the past performances of the trading institutions. Given the choice of institutions, market outcomes are determined by an equilibrium concept that allows for rationing. We find that full coordination on the market-clearing institutions without any rationing is a stochastically stable outcome, independently of the characteristics of the alternative available institutions. We also find, though, that coordination on other, non-market-clearing institutions with rationing can be stochastically stable.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 44 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Netzer, Nick, 2010.
"The logit-response dynamics,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 413-427, March.
- Dreze, Jacques H, 1975. "Existence of an Exchange Equilibrium under Price Rigidities," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 16(2), pages 301-20, June.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2003.
"Does Learning Lead to Coordination in Market Clearing Institutions?,"
Vienna Economics Papers
0319, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Kirchsteiger Georg & Alós-Ferrer Carlos, 2003. "Does Learning Lead to Coordination on Market Clearing Institutions?," Research Memorandum 053, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Nachbar, John H., 1991. "On the finiteness of the number of critical equilibria, with an application to random selections," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 397-409.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ana Ania, 2005. "The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(3), pages 497-516, October.
- Plott, Charles R, 1982.
"Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1485-1527, December.
- Plott, Charles R., . "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Working Papers 405, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2000. "Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria," Vienna Economics Papers 0008, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
- Stahn, Hubert, 1999. "Monopolistic behaviors and general equilibrium: a generalization of Nikaido's work," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 87-112, August.
- Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002.
"Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September.
- Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, . "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Faias, Marta & Moreno-Garcia, Emma & Pascoa, Mario Rui, 2002. "Real indeterminacy of equilibria and manipulability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 325-340, July.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Glenn Ellison, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:44:y:2010:i:3:p:339-360. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.