Myopic Oligopoly Pricing
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Iwan Bos & Marco A. Marini & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2021. "Myopic Oligopoly Pricing," Working Papers 2021.32, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Bos, Iwan & Marini, Marco A. & Saulle, Riccardo, 2021. "Myopic Oligopoly Pricing," MPRA Paper 111176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bos, Iwan & Marini, Marco A. & Saulle, Riccardo D., 2021. "Myopic Oligopoly Pricing," FEEM Working Papers 310282, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Bos, Iwan & Marini, Marco A. & Saulle, Riccardo D., 2021. "Myopic Oligopoly Pricing," FEEM Working Papers 317126, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Iwan Bos & Marco A. Marini & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2021. "Myopic Oligopoly Pricing," Working Papers 5/21, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.
- Iwan Bos & Marco A. Marini & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2021. "Myopic Oligopoly Pricing," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0271, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
References listed on IDEAS
- Itai Arieli & H. Peyton Young, 2016. "Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 627-676, March.
- Joao Montez & Nicolas Schutz, 2021.
"All-Pay Oligopolies: Price Competition with Unobservable Inventory Choices [Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames],"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2407-2438.
- Joao Montez & Nicolas Schutz, 2018. "All-Pay Oligopolies: Price Competition With Unobservable Inventory Choices," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_020, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Montez, João & Schutz, Nicolas, 2018. "All-Pay Oligopolies: Price Competition with Unobservable Inventory Choices," CEPR Discussion Papers 12963, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2006. "Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 77-94, January.
- Michael D. Noel, 2007. "Edgeworth Price Cycles: Evidence From The Toronto Retail Gasoline Market," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 69-92, March.
- Roos, Nicolas de & Smirnov, Vladimir, 2021.
"Collusion, price dispersion, and fringe competition,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
- de Roos, Nicolas & Smirnov, Vladimir, 2019. "Collusion, price dispersion, and fringe competition," Working Papers 2019-13, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Arieli, Itai & Young, H. Peyton, 2016. "Stochastic learning dynamics and speed of convergence in population games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68715, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Zhongmin Wang, 2008. "Collusive Communication and Pricing Coordination in a Retail Gasoline Market," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 32(1), pages 35-52, February.
- Dixon, Huw, 1990. "Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibria when Firms Avoid Turning Customers Away," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 131-146, December.
- David P. Myatt, 2019. "A Theory of Stable Price Dispersion," Economics Series Working Papers 873, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Melissa Linder, 2018. "Price cycles in the German retail gasoline market - Competition or collusion?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(1), pages 593-602.
- Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang & Juan Feng, 2011. "Cyclical Bid Adjustments in Search-Engine Advertising," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(9), pages 1703-1719, February.
- Dixon, Huw David, 1992. "The Competitive Outcome as the Equilibrium in an Edgeworthian Price-Quantity Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 301-309, March.
- Miguel A. Fonseca & Hans-Theo Normann, 2013.
"Excess Capacity and Pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets: Experimental Evidence,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(2), pages 199-228, June.
- Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012. "Excess capacity and pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets: Experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 67, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Vives, Xavier, 1986. "Rationing rules and Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in large markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 113-116.
- Øystein Foros & Frode Steen, 2013. "Vertical Control and Price Cycles in Gasoline Retailing," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(3), pages 640-661, July.
- Unknown, 1986. "Letters," Choices: The Magazine of Food, Farm, and Resource Issues, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 1(4), pages 1-9.
- James W. Friedman, 1988. "On the Strategic Importance of Prices versus Quantities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 607-622, Winter.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
- Eckert, Andrew, 2003. "Retail price cycles and the presence of small firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 151-170, February.
- Dindos, Martin & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2006. "Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 261-292, February.
- Huw Dixon, 2020. "Almost‐Maximization as a Behavioral Theory of the Firm: Static, Dynamic and Evolutionary Perspectives," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(2), pages 237-258, March.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Iwan Bos & Marco A. Marini, 2022.
"Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number,"
Games, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-16, December.
- Bos, Iwan & Marini, Marco A., 2022. "Oligopoly pricing: the role of firm size and number," MPRA Paper 115800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Iwan Bos & Marco A. Marini, 2022. "Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number," Working Papers 11/22, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.
- Edwards, Robert A. & Routledge, Robert R., 2022. "Information, Bertrand–Edgeworth competition and the law of one price," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Iwan Bos & Marco A. Marini, 2022.
"Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number,"
Games, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-16, December.
- Iwan Bos & Marco A. Marini, 2022. "Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number," Working Papers 11/22, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.
- Bos, Iwan & Marini, Marco A., 2022. "Oligopoly pricing: the role of firm size and number," MPRA Paper 115800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Edwards, Robert A. & Routledge, Robert R., 2022. "Information, Bertrand–Edgeworth competition and the law of one price," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
- Jacobs, Martin & Requate, Till, 2016. "Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with increasing marginal costs and voluntary trading: Experimental evidence," Economics Working Papers 2016-01, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
- Tveito, Andreas, 2019. "Coordination and price leadership in an unregulated environment," Working Papers in Economics 4/19, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2004. "Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms," Discussion Papers 04-12, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2004. "Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium: Manipulable residual demand," Discussion Papers 04-15, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Yakov Babichenko, 2018. "Fast Convergence of Best-Reply Dynamics in Aggregative Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 43(1), pages 333-346, February.
- Timothy Holt & Mitsuru Igami & Simon Scheidegger, 2021. "Detecting Edgeworth Cycles," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 21.16, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2008.
"Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 746-761, May.
- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2007. "Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms," MPRA Paper 3353, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- David P. Byrne, Gordon W. Leslie, and Roger Ware, 2015. "How do Consumers Respond to Gasoline Price Cycles?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1).
- García Díaz, Antón & Kujal, Praveen, 1998.
"List princing and pure strategy outcomes in a bertrand edgeworth duopoly,"
UC3M Working papers. Economics
6089, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- García Díaz, Antón & Kujal, Praveen, 2003. "List pricing and pure strategy outcomes in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly," UC3M Working papers. Economics we034918, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Perdiguero, Jordi & Jiménez, Juan Luis, 2021. "Price coordination in the Spanish oil market: The monday effect," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
- Eibelshäuser, Steffen & Wilhelm, Sascha, 2017. "Markets Take Breaks: Dynamic Price Competition with Opening Hours," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168247, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Melissa Linder, 2018. "Price cycles in the German retail gasoline market - Competition or collusion?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(1), pages 593-602.
- Waddle, Roberts, 2005. "Strategic profit sharing between firms: the bertrand model," UC3M Working papers. Economics we050902, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Noel, Michael D. & Chu, Lanlan, 2015. "Forecasting gasoline prices in the presence of Edgeworth Price Cycles," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 204-214.
- Demuynck, Thomas & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Saulle, Riccardo & Seel, Christian, 2018. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments (RM/17/002-revised)," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Tasnádi, Attila, 2020.
"Production in advance versus production to order: Equilibrium and social surplus,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 11-18.
- Tasnádi, Attila, 2019. "Production in advance versus production to order: Equilibrium and social surplus," Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) 2019/06, Corvinus University of Budapest.
- Isakower, Sean & Wang, Zhongmin, 2014. "A comparison of regular price cycles in gasoline and liquefied petroleum gas," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 445-454.
- Anderson, Edward, 2011. "A new model for cycles in retail petrol prices," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 210(2), pages 436-447, April.
More about this item
Keywords
Behavioral IO; Bounded Rationality; Capacity Constraints; Oligopoly Pricing; Myopic Stable Set;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2021-04-19 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CWA-2021-04-19 (Central and Western Asia)
- NEP-GTH-2021-04-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2021-04-19 (Industrial Organization)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2021.09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alberto Prina Cerai (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feemmit.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.