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Games with coupled populations: An experiment in continuous time

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  • Benndorf, Volker
  • Martínez-Martínez, Ismael
  • Normann, Hans-Theo

Abstract

We propose a model of coupled population games where intra- and intergroup interactions overlap. We analyze the general class of symmetric 2×2 games with coupled replicator dynamics in this framework. Standard one- and two-population predictions extend to a total of ten regions with different sets of attractors, among them novel hybrid points where one population randomizes and the other plays a pure strategy. Building on the theoretical analysis, we run continuous-time laboratory experiments using 48 different variants of coupled games. Observations confirm the theory to a large extent, but we also find a number of systematic deviations. When the attractors' eigenvalues are smaller (in absolute terms), play converges to steady states located further from the prediction.

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  • Benndorf, Volker & Martínez-Martínez, Ismael & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2021. "Games with coupled populations: An experiment in continuous time," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:195:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000983
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105281
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Equilibrium selection; Population games; Continuous-time experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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