Evolution, Teamwork and Collective Action: Production Targets in the Private Provision of Public Goods
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lu, Peng, 2016. "Predicting peak of participants in collective action," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 274(C), pages 318-330.
- Tamás L. Balogh & Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "On the origin of r-concavity and related concepts," ECON - Working Papers 187, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Lu, Peng & Wang, Zheng & Nie, Shizhao & Pujia, Wangmo & Lu, Pengfei & Chen, Baosheng, 2018. "Exploring the participate propensity in cyberspace collective actions: The 5‰ rule," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 503(C), pages 582-590.
- Friehe, Tim & Tabbach, Avraham, 2018. "A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 22-34.
- Robertas Zubrickas, 2013. "The provision point mechanism with reward money," ECON - Working Papers 114, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2013.
- Wallace, Chris & Young, H. Peyton, 2015. "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
- Lu, Peng, 2015. "Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners’ dilemma games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 436(C), pages 327-337.
- Kealey, Terence & Ricketts, Martin, 2014. "Modelling science as a contribution good," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 1014-1024.
- Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol & McLean, Richard P., 2014.
"Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean, 2011. "Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games," Departmental Working Papers 201125, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:534:p:61-90. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/resssea.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.