Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
A celebrated result of Black (1984a) demonstrates the existence of a simple majority winner when preferences are single-peaked. The social choice follows the preferences of the median voter's most preferred outcome beats any alternative. However, this conclusion does not extend to elections in which candidates differ in more than one dimension. This paper provides a multi-dimensional analog of the median voter result. We show that the mean voter's most preferred outcome is unbeatable according to a 64%-majority rule. The weaker conditions supporting this result represent a significant generalization of Caplin and Nalebuff (1988). The proof of our mean voter result uses a mathematical aggregation theorem due to Prekopa (1971, 1973) and Borell (1975). This theorem has broad applications in economics. An application to the distribution of income is described at the end of this paper; results on imperfect competition are presented in the companion paper [CFDP 937].
|Date of creation:||Feb 1990|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Econometrica (January 1991), 59(1): 1-23|
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- Kramer, Gerald H, 1973. "On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(2), pages 285-97, March.
- Heckman, James J & Honore, Bo E, 1990. "The Empirical Content of the Roy Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1121-49, September.
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- Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
- Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
- Gupta, Somesh Das, 1980. "Brunn-Minkowski inequality and its aftermath," Journal of Multivariate Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 296-318, September.
- Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff, 1990.
"Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
937, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 25-59, January.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 511-14, March.
- Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
- McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
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