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Majority voting with stochastic preferences : The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members

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  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon

Abstract

We study the volatility of the policy chosen by a committee whose members have volatile preferences. It is smaller than if it was chosen by a single member, smaller the larger the size of the committee, and smaller the volatility of members' preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2004. "Majority voting with stochastic preferences : The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2004-07, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:lar:wpaper:2004-07
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    Cited by:

    1. Bernal, Oscar & Oosterlinck, Kim & Szafarz, Ariane, 2010. "Observing bailout expectations during a total eclipse of the sun," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1193-1205, November.
    2. Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 817-832, December.
    3. Farvaque, Etienne & Matsueda, Norimichi & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2009. "How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 534-546, December.
    4. Charles Plaigin, 2009. "Exploratory study on the presence of cultural and institutional growth spillovers," DULBEA Working Papers 09-03.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    5. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Ariane Szafarz, 2008. "Labor market discrimination as an agency cost," DULBEA Working Papers 08-19.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    6. Caroline Gerschlager, 2008. "Foolishness and identity: Amartya Sen and Adam Smith," DULBEA Working Papers 08-03.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Committee; majority voting; uncertainty; volatility.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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