Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule
This essay shows that, for any non-collegial voting rule, σ, there exists an integer, s(σ), with this property: if the policy space, W, has dimension no greater than s(σ), then there exists a profile of smooth utilities on W, such that the core for σ at this profile is non-empty and ‘structurally stable’ under sufficiently small perturbation. We also show how we may compute s(σ) for an arbitrary rule. This material is based upon work supported by NSF grant SES-84-18296, to the School of Social Sciences, University of California at Irvine. An early draft was written while the author was Sherman Fairchild Distinguished Scholar at the California Institute of Technology. Thanks are due to Kenneth Shepsle, Dick McKelvey and Gary Cox for helpful comments, to Michael Chwe and Shaun Bowler for research assistance, and to Derek Hearl and Ian Budge for permission to make use of unpublished data. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 51 (1986)
Issue (Month): 3 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Norman Schofield, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705.
- McKelvey, Richard D & Schofield, Norman, 1987.
"Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point,"
Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 923-33, July.
- Schofield, Norman., .
"Social Equilibrium and Cycles on Compact Sets,"
484, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Cohen, Linda, 1979. "Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-12, February.
- Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 1985. "The politics of flatland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 45-60, January.
- Norman Schofield, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 45(3), pages 575-594.
- Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
- Schofield, Norman, 1980. "Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 175-192, July.
- McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
- Linda Cohen & Steven Matthews, 1980.
"Constrained Plott Equilibria, Directional Equilibria and Global Cycling Sets,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 47(5), pages 975-986.
- Cohen, Linda & Matthews, Steven A., . "Constrained Plott Equilibria, Directional Equilibria, and Global Cycling Sets," Working Papers 178, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- McKelvey, Richard D. & Schofield, Norman, 1986.
"Structural instability of the core,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 179-198, June.
- Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
- Matthews, Steven A, 1982. "Local Simple Games in Public Choice Mechanisms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(3), pages 623-45, October.
- Judith Sloss, 1973. "Stable outcomes in majority rule voting games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 19-48, June.
- Schofield, Norman., . "Classification Theorem for Smooth Social Choice," Working Papers 514, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:51:y:1986:i:3:p:267-284. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.