Executive veto, legislative override, and structure-induced equilibrium
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References listed on IDEAS
- Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
- Robert Mackay & Carolyn Weaver, 1981. "Agenda control by budget maximizers in a multi-bureau setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 447-472, January.
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- Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
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- McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Samuel Baker, 2000. "Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 63-79, July.
- Reza Baqir, 2001. "Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto," IMF Working Papers 01/208, International Monetary Fund.
- Douglas A. Irwin, 2008. "Antebellum Tariff Politics: Regional Coalitions and Shifting Economic Interests," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(4), pages 715-741, November.
- Congleton, Roger D., 2007. "From royal to parliamentary rule without revolution: The economics of constitutional exchange within divided governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 261-284, June.
- David Schap, 1988. "In search of efficacious executive veto authority," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 247-257, September.
- Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A, 1993. "Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative Examination of the Line-Item Veto," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 707-723, December.
- Roger Congleton, 2001. "On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 193-215, September.
- Kim, Kwang-ho, 2007. "Favoritism and reverse discrimination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 101-123, January.
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