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Proposal Rights and Political Power

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  • Tasos Kalandrakis

Abstract

In a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players' voting rights or their impatience. For all monotonic voting rules and discount factors, and for all divisions of the good among players, there exists a stationary proposal‐making rule such that this division represents players' expected payoffs in a Stationary Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The result highlights the significance of proposal rights in determining political power in collective deliberations.

Suggested Citation

  • Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "Proposal Rights and Political Power," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(2), pages 441-448, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:50:y:2006:i:2:p:441-448
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00193.x
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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