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Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative Examination of the Line-Item Veto

  • Dearden, James A
  • Husted, Thomas A

This paper reconsiders the impact of the governor's line-item veto on the state budget process. The governor's ability to obtain his or her most desired budget measures item veto effectiveness, rather than a smaller expenditure budget. The percentage difference between the final state budget and the governor's original budget request over fiscal years 1983-89 is examined. The emprical results indicate that under certain political situations the line-item veto authority enhances the governor's ability to obtain his or her desired budget. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 77 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 707-23

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:77:y:1993:i:4:p:707-23
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  1. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, 1988. "The Line Item Veto and Public Sector Budgets: Evidence from the States," NBER Working Papers 2531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Thomas A. Husted, 1991. "Changes In State Income Inequality From 1981 To 1987," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 249-260, Fall.
  3. Carter, John R & Schap, David, 1990. "Line-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 103-18, Spring.
  4. John Carter & David Schap, 1987. "Executive veto, legislative override, and structure-induced equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 227-244, January.
  5. Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A, 1990. " Executive Budget Proposal, Executive Veto, Legislative Override, and Uncertainty: A Comparative Analysis of the Budgetary Process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 1-19, April.
  6. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, 1988. "The line item veto and public sector budgets : Evidence from the states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 269-292, August.
  7. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-63, February.
  8. Alm, James & Evers, Mark, 1991. " The Item Veto and State Government Expenditures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 1-15, January.
  9. Burton Abrams & William Dougan, 1986. "The effects of constitutional restraints on governmental spending," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 101-116, January.
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