Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative Examination of the Line-Item Veto
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References listed on IDEAS
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
- Douglas Holtz-Eakin, 1988. "The Line Item Veto and Public Sector Budgets: Evidence from the States," NBER Working Papers 2531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alm, James & Evers, Mark, 1991. "The Item Veto and State Government Expenditures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 1-15, January.
- Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
- Carter, John R & Schap, David, 1990. "Line-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 103-118, Spring.
- John Carter & David Schap, 1987. "Executive veto, legislative override, and structure-induced equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 227-244, January.
- Burton Abrams & William Dougan, 1986. "The effects of constitutional restraints on governmental spending," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 101-116, January.
- Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, 1988. "The line item veto and public sector budgets : Evidence from the states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 269-292, August.
- Thomas A. Husted, 1991. "Changes In State Income Inequality From 1981 To 1987," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 249-260, Fall.
- Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A, 1990. "Executive Budget Proposal, Executive Veto, Legislative Override, and Uncertainty: A Comparative Analysis of the Budgetary Process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 1-19, April.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- de Figueiredo, Rui Jr., 2003. "Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2677-2701, December.
- Toke Aidt & Francesco Giovannoni, 2011. "Critical decisions and constitutional rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(2), pages 219-268, July.
- Leandro De MagalhÃ£es & Lucas Ferrero, 2015.
"Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states,"
Southern Economic Journal,
Southern Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 598-619, October.
- Leandro M. De Magalhães & Lucas Ferrero, 2010. "Separation of Powers and the Tax Level in the U.S. States," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 14/620, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK, revised Dec 2014.
- Samuel Baker, 2000. "Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 63-79, July.
- repec:bla:pbudge:v:36:y:2016:i:4:p:26-49 is not listed on IDEAS
- John A. Dove, 2017. "Property Tax Limits, Balanced Budget Rules, and Line-Item Vetoes: A Long-Run View," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 288-317, March.
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