Line-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?
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Volume (Year): 4 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
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- Samuel Baker, 2000. "Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 63-79, July.
- George Crowley, 2012. "Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 134-165, June.
- Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A, 1993. "Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative Examination of the Line-Item Veto," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 707-723, December.
- de Figueiredo, Rui Jr., 2003. "Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2677-2701, December.
- Ursula Hackett, 2015. "But not both: the exclusive disjunction in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 75-92, January.
- Leandro M. De Magalhães & Lucas Ferrero, 2009. "Budgetary Separation of Powers in the American States and the Tax Level: A Regression Discontinuity Design," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 09/225, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Reza Baqir, 2001. "Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto," IMF Working Papers 01/208, International Monetary Fund.
- Alberto F. Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1999.
"Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions,"
NBER Chapters,in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 13-36
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1996. "Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions," NBER Working Papers 5556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1996. "Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions," IMF Working Papers 96/52, International Monetary Fund.
- Leandro De Magalhães & Lucas Ferrero, 2012. "Separation of Powers and the Size of Government in the U.S. States," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 12/285, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- John A. Dove, 2017. "Property Tax Limits, Balanced Budget Rules, and Line-Item Vetoes: A Long-Run View," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 288-317, March.
- Robert P. Inman, 1993. "Presidential Leadership and the Reform of Fiscal Policy: Learning from Reagan's Role in TRA 86," NBER Working Papers 4395, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Poterba, James M, 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 799-821, August.
- James M. Poterba, 1993. "State Responses to Fiscal Crisis: The Effects of Budgetary Institutionsand Politics," NBER Working Papers 4375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Leandro De MagalhÃ£es & Lucas Ferrero, 2015. "Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 598-619, October.
- Leandro M. De Magalhães & Lucas Ferrero, 2010. "Separation of Powers and the Tax Level in the U.S. States," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 14/620, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK, revised Dec 2014.
- David Schap, 1988. "In search of efficacious executive veto authority," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 247-257, September.
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