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Line-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?

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  • Carter, John R
  • Schap, David

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  • Carter, John R & Schap, David, 1990. "Line-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 103-118, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:4:y:1990:i:2:p:103-18
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Samuel Baker, 2000. "Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 63-79, July.
    2. George Crowley, 2012. "Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 134-165, June.
    3. Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A, 1993. "Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative Examination of the Line-Item Veto," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 707-723, December.
    4. Leandro De Magalhães & Lucas Ferrero, 2015. "Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(2), pages 598-619, October.
    5. Reza Baqir, 2001. "Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto," IMF Working Papers 2001/208, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Alberto F. Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1999. "Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 13-36, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. de Figueiredo, Rui Jr., 2003. "Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2677-2701, December.
    8. Thomas P. Lauth, 2016. "The Other Six: Governors Without The Line-Item Veto," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 26-49, December.
    9. Ursula Hackett, 2015. "But not both: the exclusive disjunction in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 75-92, January.
    10. Jinhee Jo & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 2020. "Budgetary choices and institutional rules: veto rules and budget volatility," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-25, March.
    11. Leandro M. De Magalhães & Lucas Ferrero, 2009. "Budgetary Separation of Powers in the American States and the Tax Level: A Regression Discontinuity Design," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 09/225, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    12. Samuel H. Baker, 2005. "Why Executive Power Centralizes Government," Public Finance Review, , vol. 33(6), pages 747-766, November.
    13. Leandro De Magalhães & Lucas Ferrero, 2012. "Separation of Powers and the Size of Government in the U.S. States," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 12/285, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    14. John A. Dove, 2017. "Property Tax Limits, Balanced Budget Rules, and Line-Item Vetoes: A Long-Run View," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 288-317, March.
    15. Robert P. Inman, 1993. "Presidential Leadership and the Reform of Fiscal Policy: Learning from Reagan's Role in TRA 86," NBER Working Papers 4395, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Darío Cestau, 2018. "The political affiliation effect on state credit risk," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 135-154, April.
    17. Poterba, James M, 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 799-821, August.
    18. David Schap, 1988. "In search of efficacious executive veto authority," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 247-257, September.

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