IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v87y2003i12p2677-2701.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto

Author

Listed:
  • de Figueiredo, Rui Jr.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • de Figueiredo, Rui Jr., 2003. "Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2677-2701, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:12:p:2677-2701
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047-2727(02)00167-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A, 1993. "Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative Examination of the Line-Item Veto," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 707-723, December.
    2. Gilligan, Thomas W & Matsusaka, John G, 1995. "Deviations from Constituent Interests: The Role of Legislative Structure and Political Parties in the States," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(3), pages 383-401, July.
    3. Gilligan, Thomas W. & Matsusaka, John G., 2001. "Fiscal Policy, Legislature Size, and Political Parties: Evidence From State and Local Governments in the First Half of the 20th Century," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 54(1), pages 57-82, March.
    4. Newey, Whitney & West, Kenneth, 2014. "A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 33(1), pages 125-132.
    5. De Figueiredo, Rui J. P., 2002. "Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(2), pages 321-333, June.
    6. Bradbury, John Charles & Crain, W. Mark, 2001. "Legislative organization and government spending: cross-country evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 309-325, December.
    7. Poterba, James M, 1996. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Policy in the U.S. States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 395-400, May.
    8. Gilligan, Thomas W. & Matsusaka, John G., 2001. "Fiscal Policy, Legislature Size, and Political Parties: Evidence from State and Local Governments in the First Half of the 20th Century," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 1), pages 57-82, March.
    9. Kiefer, Nicholas M, 1988. "Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 646-679, June.
    10. Alt, James E. & Lowry, Robert C., 1994. "Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(4), pages 811-828, December.
    11. Alm, James & Evers, Mark, 1991. "The Item Veto and State Government Expenditures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 1-15, January.
    12. Poterba, James M, 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 799-821, August.
    13. Carter, John R & Schap, David, 1990. "Line-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 103-118, Spring.
    14. White, Halbert & Domowitz, Ian, 1984. "Nonlinear Regression with Dependent Observations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 143-161, January.
    15. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Germà Bel & Ringa Raudla & Miguel Rodrigues & António F. Tavares, 2018. "These rules are made for spending: testing and extending the law of 1/n," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 41-60, January.
    2. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Jason Snyder, 2009. "Political Dynasties," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(1), pages 115-142.
    3. Niepelt, Dirk, 2007. "Starving the beast? Intra-generational conflict and balanced budget rules," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 145-159, January.
    4. Thomas P. Lauth, 2016. "The Other Six: Governors Without The Line-Item Veto," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 26-49, December.
    5. Leandro M. De Magalhães & Lucas Ferrero, 2010. "Political Parties and the Tax Level in the American states: Two Regression Discontinuity Designs," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 10/614, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    6. Jeremy Jackson, 2013. "Tax earmarking, party politics and gubernatorial veto: theory and evidence from US states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 1-18, April.
    7. Leandro De Magalhães & Lucas Ferrero, 2015. "Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(2), pages 598-619, October.
    8. Dongwon Lee & Thomas E. Borcherding & Youngho Kang, 2014. "Public Spending and the Paradox of Supermajority Rule," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(3), pages 614-632, January.
    9. Guy Holburn & Richard Bergh, 2006. "Consumer capture of regulatory institutions: The creation of public utility consumer advocates in the United States," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 45-73, January.
    10. Jinhee Jo & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 2020. "Budgetary choices and institutional rules: veto rules and budget volatility," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-25, March.
    11. Lopez Edward J. & Jewell R. Todd & Campbell Noel D., 2009. "Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast! State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 101-135, April.
    12. de Figueiredo, Rui J P, Jr & Vanden Bergh, Richard G, 2004. "The Political Economy of State-Level Administrative Procedure Acts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 569-588, October.
    13. Dongwon Lee, 2015. "Supermajority rule and the law of 1/n," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 251-274, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dongwon Lee & Sangwon Park, 2018. "Court-ordered redistricting and the law of 1/n," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 507-528, September.
    2. Schaltegger, Christoph A. & Feld, Lars P., 2009. "Do large cabinets favor large governments? Evidence on the fiscal commons problem for Swiss Cantons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 35-47, February.
    3. Tyrefors Hinnerich, Björn, 2009. "Do merging local governments free ride on their counterparts when facing boundary reform?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 721-728, June.
    4. Henrik Jordahl & Che-Yuan Liang, 2010. "Merged municipalities, higher debt: on free-riding and the common pool problem in politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 157-172, April.
    5. Lars Feld & Christoph Schaltegger, 2010. "Political stability and fiscal policy: time series evidence for the Swiss federal level since 1849," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 505-534, September.
    6. George R. Crowley, 2019. "The Law of 1/n Revisited: Distributive Politics, Legislature Size, and the Costs of Collective Action," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(2), pages 667-690, October.
    7. Dongwon Lee, 2015. "Supermajority rule and the law of 1/n," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 251-274, September.
    8. Katsuyoshi Nakazawa, 2013. "Municipality amalgamation and free-ride behavior: Eligibility assessments for long-term care insurance in Japan," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201340, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    9. Katsuyoshi Nakazawa, 2018. "Free‐rider behaviour under voluntary amalgamation: The case of setting the long‐term care insurance premium in Japan," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 1409-1423, November.
    10. Nakazawa, Kasuyoshi, 2016. "Identifying Discretion of Municipalities to Undertake Eligibility Assessments for Japan’s Long-Term Care Insurance Program," MPRA Paper 75565, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Wehner, Joachim, 2010. "Cabinet structure and fiscal policy outcomes," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28648, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    12. Ringa Raudla, 2010. "Governing budgetary commons: what can we learn from Elinor Ostrom?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 201-221, December.
    13. George R. Crowley, 2015. "Local Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/n," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(3), pages 742-768, January.
    14. John Charles Bradbury & Noel D. Campbell, 2003. "Local Lobbying for State Grants: Evidence from Georgia's Hope Scholarship," Public Finance Review, , vol. 31(4), pages 367-391, July.
    15. Pettersson-Lidbom, Per, 2012. "Does the size of the legislature affect the size of government? Evidence from two natural experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 269-278.
    16. John G. Matsusaka, 2018. "Public policy and the initiative and referendum: a survey with some new evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 107-143, January.
    17. Thomas Gilligan & John Matsusaka, 2006. "Public choice principles of redistricting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 381-398, December.
    18. Daniel Höhmann, 2017. "The effect of legislature size on public spending: evidence from a regression discontinuity design," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(3), pages 345-367, December.
    19. De Santo, Alessia & Le Maux, Benoît, 2023. "On the optimal size of legislatures: An illustrated literature review," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    20. Leandro De Magalhães & Lucas Ferrero, 2015. "Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(2), pages 598-619, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:12:p:2677-2701. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.