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Cabinet structure and fiscal policy outcomes

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  • Wehner, Joachim

Abstract

A central explanation of fiscal performance focuses on the structure of the cabinet. However, the partisan context of cabinet decisions remains under-explored, the findings are based on small samples and the variables of interest are often poorly operationalised. Using a new dataset of spending ministers and partisan fragmentation in the cabinets of 58 countries between 1975 and 1998, this study finds a strong positive association between the number of spending ministers and budget deficits and expenditures, as well as weaker evidence that these effects increase with partisan fragmentation.

Suggested Citation

  • Wehner, Joachim, 2010. "Cabinet structure and fiscal policy outcomes," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28648, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:28648
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28648/
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:spr:ssefpa:v:9:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s12571-017-0685-z is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Mark Hallerberg & Carlos Scartascini, 2011. "Economic Crisis and Fiscal Reforms in Latin America," Research Department Publications 4697, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    3. Jochimsen, Beate & Thomasius, Sebastian, 2014. "The perfect finance minister: Whom to appoint as finance minister to balance the budget," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 390-408.
    4. Ernesto Crivelli & Sanjeev Gupta & Carlos Mulas-Granados & Carolina Correa-Caro, 2016. "Fragmented Politics and Public Debt," IMF Working Papers 16/190, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Abel Bojar, 2018. "With a Little Help from My Friends: Ministerial Alignment and Public Spending Composition in Parliamentary Democracies," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 133, European Institute, LSE.
    6. Hanna Bäck & Wolfgang C. Müller & Benjamin Nyblade, 2017. "Multiparty government and economic policy-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 33-62, January.
    7. Hyungon Kim & Chang Kwon, 2015. "The Effects of Fiscal Consolidation and Welfare Composition of Spending on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from US Gubernatorial Elections between 1978 and 2006," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(2), pages 228-253, April.
    8. Bäck, Hanna & Lindvall, Johannes, 2015. "Commitment Problems in Coalitions: A New Look at the Fiscal Policies Of Multiparty Governments," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(01), pages 53-72, January.

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    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook

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