Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence
Using a panel of 22 OECD countries over the 1971-96 period, this paper extends previous literature on the effects of fragmented government on fiscal policy outcomes in various directions. First, we focus on data relating to central government as all theories refer to central government. Second, we also examine government's position vis-a-vis parliament and government's political fragmentation. We find evidence that more fragmented governments have higher deficits, while governments that have a large majority in parliament have lower deficits. Right-wing governments appear to have been fiscally more responsible in the seventies. Political fragmentation does not affect a government's budget deficit. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 109 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jakob De Haan & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2000. "Do financial markets and the Maastricht Treaty discipline governments? New evidence," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(2), pages 221-226.
- de Haan, Jakob & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Beekhuis, Geert, 1999. "The Weak Government Thesis: Some New Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 101(3-4), pages 163-176, December.
- Barro, Robert J., 1979.
"On the Determination of the Public Debt,"
3451400, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Edin, Per-Anders & Ohlsson, Henry, 1991.
"Political determinants of budget deficits: Coalition effects versus minority effects,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 35(8), pages 1597-1603, December.
- Edin, P-A. & Ohlsson, H., 1990. "Political Determinants Of Budget Deficits: Coalition Effects Versus Minority Effects," Papers 1990k, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- de Haan, Jakob & Sturm, Jan-Egbert, 1994. "Political and Institutional Determinants of Fiscal Policy in the European Community," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(1-2), pages 157-172, July.
- Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1996.
"Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions,"
IMF Working Papers
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:109:y:2001:i:3-4:p:221-42. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.