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Wars of Attrition in Italian Government Coalitions and Fiscal Performance: 1948-1994

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  • Padovano, Fabio
  • Venturi, Larissa

Abstract

We test the "war of attrition" models of fiscal performance on the sample of Italian governments from 1948 to 1994. We control for conditioning phenomena, like government stability, majority size, central bank independence, political budget cycle and external economic constraints, as well as for business cycle indicators. We improve on the standard specifications of war of attrition models by considering the role of the opposition and by using ex ante measures of coalitions fragmentation. Once these phenomena are accounted for, data support the implications of our version of the war of attrition models. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Padovano, Fabio & Venturi, Larissa, 2001. "Wars of Attrition in Italian Government Coalitions and Fiscal Performance: 1948-1994," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 109(1-2), pages 15-54, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:109:y:2001:i:1-2:p:15-54
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    Cited by:

    1. Joshua Aizenman, 2015. "International Coordination and Precautionary Policies," NBER Working Papers 21793, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Fabio Padovano, 2014. "Distribution of transfers and soft budget spending behaviors: evidence from Italian regions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 11-29, October.
    3. Tjaša Bjedov & Simon Lapointe & Thierry Madiès, 2014. "The impact of within-party and between-party ideological dispersion on fiscal outcomes: evidence from Swiss cantonal parliaments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 209-232, October.
    4. Le Maux, Benoit & Rocaboy, Yvon, 2012. "A simple microfoundation for the utilization of fragmentation indexes to measure the performance of a team," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 491-493.
    5. John Ashworth & Emma Galli & Fabio Padovano, 2013. "Decentralization as a constraint to Leviathan: a panel cointegration analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 491-516, September.
    6. Francesco Lagona & Antonello Maruotti & Fabio Padovano, 2012. "The opposite Cycles of Laws and Decrees," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2012-01-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    7. Maxime MENUET, 2016. "Is a Long War Desirable ? Optimal Debt Concessions In Attrition Warfare," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2367, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00816 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Bharatee Dash & Angara Raja, 2013. "Do political determinants affect the size and composition of public expenditure? A study of the Indian states," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 60(3), pages 293-317, September.
    10. Fiorino, Nadia & Gavoille, Nicolas & Padovano, Fabio, 2015. "Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 56-66.
    11. Kevin Grier & Shu Lin & Haichun Ye, 2015. "Political fractionalization and delay in fiscal stabilizations: a duration analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 157-175, July.
    12. Bharatee Dash & Angara Raja, 2014. "Do political determinants affect revenue collection? Evidence from the Indian states," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(3), pages 253-278, September.
    13. Roberto Ricciuti, 2004. "Political Fragmentation and Fiscal Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(3_4), pages 365-388, March.
    14. Benoît Le Maux & Yvon Rocaboy, 2016. "Competition in fragmentation among political coalitions: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 67-94, April.
    15. Dash, Bharatee Bhusana & Raja, Angara V., 2012. "Political Determinants of the Allocation of Public Expenditures: A Study of the Indian States," Working Papers 12/101, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.

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