A simple microfoundation for the utilization of fragmentation indexes to measure the performance of a team
We propose a simple non-cooperative game model in which two fragmented teams compete to increase their performance. The theoretical framework is based on the theory of conflict. We show that, depending on the value of a parameter in the model, the power of the competing teams may be expressed as a function of well-known fragmentation indexes: the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, the Laakso–Taagepera index, the best-shot index and the weakest-link index.
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