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It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down)

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  • Josep M. Colomer

Abstract

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties that can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way around. Already‐existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of ‘behavioral‐institutional equilibrium’ to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multi‐party systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.

Suggested Citation

  • Josep M. Colomer, 2005. "It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down)," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53(1), pages 1-21, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:53:y:2005:i:1:p:1-21
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00514.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carles Boix, 1999. "Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies," Economics Working Papers 367, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    2. Boix, Carles, 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 609-624, September.
    3. Rein Taagepera, 2003. "Arend Lijphart's Dimensions of Democracy: Logical Connections and Institutional Design," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 51(1), pages 1-19, March.
    4. Riker, William H., 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 432-446, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Camille Bedock & Peter Mair and Alex Wilson, 2012. "Institutional Change in Advanced European Democracies: an exploratory assessment," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 11, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
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    3. Le Maux, Benoit & Rocaboy, Yvon, 2012. "A simple microfoundation for the utilization of fragmentation indexes to measure the performance of a team," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 491-493.
    4. Xefteris, Dimitrios & Matakos, Kostas, 2009. "An Economic Model of Strategic Electoral Rule Choice Under Uncertainty," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 917, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Maria Manuel Pinho, 2008. "The political economy of public spending composition: evidence from a panel of OECD countries," FEP Working Papers 295, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    6. Christian Walter Martin & Nils D. Steiner, 2016. "Economic globalization and the change of electoral rules," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 355-376, December.
    7. Selim Ergun, 2010. "From plurality rule to proportional representation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 373-408, November.
    8. Michael Mitsopoulos & Theodore Pelagidis, 2017. "A model of constitutional design and corruption," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 67-90, August.
    9. Cusack, Thomas R. & Iversen, Torben & Soskice, David, 2007. "Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Institutions, States, Markets SP II 2007-07, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    10. repec:gig:joupla:v:1:y:2009:i:1:p:123-141 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Camille Bedock, 2017. "When Electoral Competition Determines Disproportionality Majority Bonus and Regional Elections in France and Italy," CEVIPOL Working Papers n°1 / 2017, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    12. Konstantinos Matakos & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2015. "Strategic electoral rule choice under uncertainty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 329-350, March.
    13. Bishop, Matthew Louis & Corbett, Jack & Veenendaal, Wouter, 2020. "Labor movements and party system development: Why does the Caribbean have stable two-party systems, but the Pacific does not?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    14. Eduardo Álvarez-Miranda & Camilo Campos-Valdés & Maurcio Morales Quiroga & Matías Moreno-Faguett & Jordi Pereira, 2020. "A Multi-Criteria Pen for Drawing Fair Districts: When Democratic and Demographic Fairness Matter," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(9), pages 1-26, August.
    15. Jessica Fortin-Rittberger & Berthold Rittberger, 2014. "Do electoral rules matter? Explaining national differences in women's representation in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(4), pages 496-520, December.
    16. Camille Bedock & Peter Mair and Alex Wilson, 2012. "Institutional Change in Advanced European Democracies: an exploratory assessment," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 11, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    17. Josep Colomer, 2014. "Equilibrium institutions: the federal-proportional trade-off," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 559-576, March.
    18. Selim Jurgen Ergun & M. Fernanda Rivas & M�ximo Rossi, 2019. "Satisfaction with democracy in Latin America: Do the characteristics of the political system matter?," Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad, Universidad de los Andes,Facultad de Economía, CEDE, vol. 83(9), pages 353-383.

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