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From Plurality Rule to Proportional Representation

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  • Selim Ergun

    (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.)

Abstract

I consider the decision of a parliament that might change the electoral system for the forthcoming elections from plurality rule to proportional representation. Parties are o¢ ce-motivated. They care about winning and about the share of seats obtained. I consider two di¤erent scenarios of how parties in the government share the spoils of o¢ ce: Equally or proportionally to their share of seats. If the government is formed by a single party and parties expect that each party will obtain the same share of votes in the next election the electoral rule will never be changed. That is, for a change to occur the government should be formed by a coalition. I ?nd that a change is more likely to occur when the number of parties is larger and also when the spoils of o¢ ce are shared equally among the members in the governing coalition. I extend these results to analyze the decision of a change from a less proportional rule to a more proportional one.

Suggested Citation

  • Selim Ergun, 2008. "From Plurality Rule to Proportional Representation," ThE Papers 08/07, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
  • Handle: RePEc:gra:wpaper:08/07
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
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    5. Boix, Carles, 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 609-624, September.
    6. Carles Boix, 1999. "Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies," Economics Working Papers 367, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. Josep M. Colomer, 2005. "It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down)," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53, pages 1-21, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Selim Jürgen Ergun, 2011. "Income Redistribution and Public-Good Provision in a Diverse Society," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(2), pages 291-313, June.
    2. George Tridimas, 2017. "Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the evolution of the frequency of decision making," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 209-230, September.
    3. Selim Jurgen Ergun & M. Fernanda Rivas & Máximo Rossi, 2019. "Satisfaction with democracy in Latin America: Do the characteristics of the political system matter?," Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad, Universidad de los Andes,Facultad de Economía, CEDE, vol. 83(9), pages 353-383, July.
    4. Xefteris, Dimitrios & Matakos, Kostas, 2009. "An Economic Model of Strategic Electoral Rule Choice Under Uncertainty," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 917, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Konstantinos Matakos & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2015. "Strategic electoral rule choice under uncertainty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 329-350, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electoral systems; Plurality; Proportional Representation; Coalitions.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

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