From Plurality Rule to Proportional Representation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Selim Ergun, 2010. "From plurality rule to proportional representation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 373-408, November.
References listed on IDEAS
- Carles Boix, 1999. "Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies," Economics Working Papers 367, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Josep M. Colomer, 2005.
"It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down),"
Political Studies Association, vol. 53, pages 1-21, March.
- Josep M. Colomer, 2005. "It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)," Economics Working Papers 812, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- John Maloney & Bernard Pearson & Andrew Pickering, 2003.
"Behind the cube rule: implications of, and evidence against a fractal electoral geography,"
Environment and Planning A,
Pion Ltd, London, vol. 35(8), pages 1405-1414, August.
- John Maloney & Bernard Pearson & Andrew Pickering, 2003. "Behind the Cube Rule: Implications of, and Evidence against a Fractal Electoral Geography," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 35(8), pages 1405-1414, August.
- John Maloney & Bernard Pearson & Andrew Pickering, 2001. "Behind the cube rule: implications of, and evidence against a fractal electoral geography," Discussion Papers 0103, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Selim Jürgen Ergun, 2011.
"Income Redistribution and Public-Good Provision in a Diverse Society,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(2), pages 291-313, June.
- Selim Jürgen Ergun, 2009. "Income Redistribution and Public Good Provision in a Diverse Society," ThE Papers 09/04, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- repec:kap:copoec:v:28:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-017-9241-2 is not listed on IDEAS
- Xefteris, Dimitrios & Matakos, Kostas, 2009.
"An Economic Model of Strategic Electoral Rule Choice Under Uncertainty,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
917, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Matakos, Konstantinos & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2011. "An Economic Model of Strategic Electoral Rule Choice Under Uncertainty," Economic Research Papers 271283, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Konstantinos Matakos & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2015. "Strategic electoral rule choice under uncertainty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 329-350, March.
More about this item
KeywordsElectoral systems; Plurality; Proportional Representation; Coalitions.;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-11-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-11-04 (Positive Political Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gra:wpaper:08/07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Angel Solano Garcia.). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dtugres.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.