Income Redistribution and Public-Good Provision in a Diverse Society
I analyze the postelectoral coalition formation process in a two-dimensional political environment. The two dimensions are the degree of a proportional tax rate and the degree of a group-specific public good. Parties are office-motivated and care instrumentally about policy. I analyze when stable coalitions exist and obtain that for that to occur office benefits should exceed a certain level. I analyze how this critical level and the set of policies implemented are affected by the income levels and the degree of diversity. For both office- and policy-motivated parties the same result holds, but the critical level might be lower for the latter.
Volume (Year): 167 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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- Enriqueta Aragonés, 2007.
"The Key Party in the Catalan Government,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
681.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Enriqueta Aragonès, 2007. "Government formation in a two dimensional policy space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 151-184, January.
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