Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action
This essay provides an up-to-date summary of the findings of the literature on the economics of alliances. We show that the study of the economics of alliances has played a pivotal role in understanding and applying public good analysis to real-world applications. We establish that the manner in which alliances address burden sharing and allocative issues is related to strategic doctrines, weapon technology, perceived threats, and membership composition. Past contributions are evaluated, and areas needing further development are identified. The theoretical and empirical knowledge gained from the study of alliances is shown to be directly applicable to a wide range of international collectives.
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Volume (Year): 39 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Cahiers de recherche
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