IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jpbect/v1y1999i4p499-509.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction

Author

Listed:
  • Cornes, Richard
  • Hartley, Roger
  • Sandler, Todd

Abstract

This paper presents a proof for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium of a public good model that exploits a simple contraction mapping. The proof establishes both existence and uniqueness in a single exercise that provides intuition about sufficiency. The method of proof is applied not only to the basic pure public good model but also to the impure model. In the latter model, income normality does not play the same pivotal role for existence and uniqueness. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

Suggested Citation

  • Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger & Sandler, Todd, 1999. " Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(4), pages 499-509.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:1:y:1999:i:4:p:499-509
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=jpet&volume=1&issue=4&year=1999&part=null
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Todd Sandler & Daniel G. Arce M., 2003. "Pure Public Goods versus Commons: Benefit-Cost Duality," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 79(3), pages 355-368.
    2. Emanuela Randon, 2002. "L’analisi positiva dell’esternalità: rassegna della letteratura e nuovi spunti," Working Papers 58, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2002.
    3. Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin, 2007. "Games without Rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(4), pages 315-347, December.
    4. Clive Fraser, 2012. "Milton Friedman, the Demand for Money and the ECB’s Monetary-Policy Strategy," Discussion Papers in Economics 12/06, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
    5. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2007. "Alliances Among Asymmetric Countries," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(3), pages 253-263.
    6. Gaube, Thomas, 2006. "Altruism and charitable giving in a fully replicated economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1649-1667, September.
    7. Villanacci, Antonio & Zenginobuz, E.Unal, 2005. "Existence and regularity of equilibria in a general equilibrium model with private provision of a public good," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(4-5), pages 617-636, August.
    8. Tim Lohse & Julio R. Robledo & Ulrich Schmidt, 2012. "Self‐Insurance and Self‐Protection as Public Goods," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 79(1), pages 57-76, March.
    9. Christoph Luelfesmann, 2007. "Dual Provision of Public Policies in Democracy," Discussion Papers dp07-20, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    10. Todd Sandler, 2009. "Intergenerational Public Goods: Transnational Considerations," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 56(3), pages 353-370, July.
    11. Thomas Gaube, 2005. "Altruism and charitable giving in a fully replicated economy," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_8, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    12. Karen Pittel & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2004. "Private Provision of Public Goods : Incentives for Donations," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 04/34, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    13. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2007. "Aggregative Public Good Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 201-219, April.
    14. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2010. "Conflict of interest and coordination in public good provision," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 389-408.
    15. Villanacci, Antonio & Zenginobuz, E. Unal, 2006. "Subscription equilibria with public production: Existence and regularity," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 199-215, December.
    16. Gaube, Thomas, 2001. "Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 127-132, January.
    17. Thomas Gaube, 1999. "Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse13_2000, University of Bonn, Germany, revised May 2000.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:1:y:1999:i:4:p:499-509. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/apettea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.