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Changing threat perceptions and the efficient provisioning of international security

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  • Rupayan Gupta

Abstract

This paper proposes a mechanism for structuring international institutions to efficiently provision global security against the threat of a rogue nation, by an alliance of nations. This paper investigates how the evolution of public opinion, in the respective countries facing the rogue nation's threat, affects the mechanism. It also analyzes the impact of “fair‐weather friends” within the alliance, i.e., allies that increase support for security effort when the threat becomes less dangerous but withdraw support in more dangerous circumstances. Additionally, it explores how the possibility of sequential action by the allies, rather than simultaneous action, might affect joint security efforts. Perceptions changeantes de menace et l'approvisionnement efficace de la sécurité internationale. Ce texte propose un mécanisme pour structurer les institutions internationales pour qu'elles fournissent efficacement de la sécurité globale via une alliance de nations contre la menace d'un état voyou. On examine comment l'évolution de l'opinion publique dans les divers pays confrontés aux menaces d'une nation voyou affecte le mécanisme. On analyse aussi l'impact des ≪ amis quand tout va bien ≫ dans une alliance – des alliés qui accroissent leur support à l'effort de sécurité quand la menace devient moins dangereuse, mais retirent leur support quand les circonstances deviennent plus dangereuses. Enfin, on explore comment la possibilité d'action séquentielle par les alliés, plutôt qu'une action simultanée, peut affecter l'effort conjoint de sécurité.

Suggested Citation

  • Rupayan Gupta, 2014. "Changing threat perceptions and the efficient provisioning of international security," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(4), pages 1312-1341, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:47:y:2014:i:4:p:1312-1341
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12108
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