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The elementary economics of social dilemmas

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  • B. Curtis Eaton

Abstract

A social dilemma is, in essence, a prisoners' dilemma in a continuous strategy space. I discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention, offer an elementary, diagrammatic synthesis of them, and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture, including incentives for pre-commitment. Finally, I model pre-commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • B. Curtis Eaton, 2004. "The elementary economics of social dilemmas," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(4), pages 805-829, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:37:y:2004:i:4:p:805-829
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    Cited by:

    1. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 2011. "Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 136-147, January.
    2. Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Magnus HOFFMANN, 2010. "Endogenous timing game with non-monotonic reaction functions," Working Papers 201017, CERDI.
    3. Rébillé, Yann & Richefort, Lionel, 2014. "Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in network games with additive preferences," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 232(3), pages 601-606.
    4. Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, 2009. "Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 1125-1147.
    5. Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2016. "Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment," Working Papers halshs-01332058, HAL.
    6. Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2012. "Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 168-184.
    7. Divya Datt & Meeta Keswani Mehra, 2016. "Environmental Policy in a Federation with Special Interest Politics and Inter-Governmental Grants," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 64(4), pages 575-595, August.
    8. Sengupta, Bodhisattva, 2016. "Endogenous Leadership in a Federal Transfer Game," MPRA Paper 71882, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Todd Sandler & Javed Younas, 2011. "Foreign aid as counterterrorism policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 423-447, July.
    10. Sengupta, Bodhisatva, 2016. "Endogenous Leadership in a Federal Transfer Game," Working Papers 16/180, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    11. Hubert Kempf & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2015. "Further analysis on leadership in tax competition: the role of capital ownership—a comment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(6), pages 1028-1039, December.
    12. Bodhisattva Sengupta, 2016. "Endogenous Leadership in a Federal Transfer Game," Working Papers id:11473, eSocialSciences.

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