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Protection, Technological Transfer and Alliance against Terrorist Conflict

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  • Sylvain Baumann

    (EDEHN - Equipe d'Economie Le Havre Normandie - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université)

Abstract

This paper investigates the defensive measures of a government threatened by a terrorist organization. Some authors have studied only the alliance with a neighbouring country to protect from an external attack. This is the reason why our model focuses on a possible coalition with a terrorist group even if this cooperation is frowned upon by the international community. The second model deals with the protection technology. Indeed, the alliance between countries enables the transfer of such a protection. The example of the NATO justifies this analysis because of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Then, we show that helping a threatened country leads to negative externalities due to this collaboration. The effects of the parameters differ, resulting in the optimal choice of the targeted country concerning its security.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Baumann, 2018. "Protection, Technological Transfer and Alliance against Terrorist Conflict," Post-Print hal-02949083, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02949083
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02949083
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Atkinson, Scott E & Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John, 1987. "Terrorism in a Bargaining Framework," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21, April.
    2. Todd Sandler, 1999. "Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion, and the Core," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(6), pages 727-747, December.
    3. Todd Sandler & Kevin Siqueira, 2006. "Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre-emption," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1370-1387, November.
    4. Sandler, Todd & Enders, Walter, 2004. "An economic perspective on transnational terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-316, June.
    5. Lapan, Harvey E & Sandler, Todd, 1988. "To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 16-21, May.
    6. Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 1993. "Terrorism and signalling," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 383-397, August.
    7. Sylvain Baumann, 2016. "Spying solution in the framework of terrorist conflicts," Post-Print hal-02986911, HAL.
    8. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T. & Cauley, Jon, 1983. "A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 36-54, March.
    9. Lee, Dwight R, 1988. "Free Riding and Paid Riding in the Fight against Terrorism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 22-26, May.
    10. Todd Sandler & John L. Scott, 1987. "Terrorist Success in Hostage-Taking Incidents," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 35-53, March.
    11. Enders, Walter & Sandler, Todd, 1993. "The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(4), pages 829-844, December.
    12. Sandler, Todd & Lapan, Harvey E., 1988. "The Calculus of Dissent: An Analysis of Terrorists' Choice of Targets," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10818, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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