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Applying Intermediate Microeconomics to Terrorism

Author

Listed:
  • Charles Anderton

    () (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross)

  • John Carter

    () (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross)

Abstract

The authors show how microeconomic concepts and principles are applicable to the study of terrorism. The utility maximization model provides insights into both terrorist resource allocation choices and government counterterrorism efforts, while basic game theory helps characterize the strategic interdependencies among terrorists and governments.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Anderton & John Carter, 2004. "Applying Intermediate Microeconomics to Terrorism," Working Papers 0412, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hcx:wpaper:0412
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    File URL: http://web.holycross.edu/RePEc/hcx/HC0412-Anderton-Carter_Terrorism.pdf
    File Function: Original paper written in August 2004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Todd Sandler, 2003. "Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(6), pages 779-802, June.
    2. Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, 2003. "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 119-144, Fall.
    3. Sandler, Todd & Enders, Walter, 2004. "An economic perspective on transnational terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-316, June.
    4. Lapan, Harvey E & Sandler, Todd, 1988. "To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 16-21, May.
    5. Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, "undated". "How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence," IEW - Working Papers 137, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    6. Charles Anderton & John Carter, 2005. "On Rational Choice Theory And The Study Of Terrorism," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 275-282.
    7. Enders, Walter & Sandler, Todd, 1995. "Terrorism: Theory and applications," Handbook of Defense Economics,in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 213-249 Elsevier.
    8. Sandler,Todd & Hartley,Keith, 1995. "The Economics of Defense," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521447287, April.
    9. Lee, Dwight R, 1988. "Free Riding and Paid Riding in the Fight against Terrorism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 22-26, May.
    10. Todd Sandler & Kevin Siqueira, 2006. "Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre-emption," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1370-1387, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521698658, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    terrorism; rational choice model; income and substitution effects; Slutsky equation; game theory; prisoners’ dilemma; chicken; public goods;

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • A22 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Undergraduate
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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