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Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis

  • Axel Dreher
  • Justina A.V. Fischer

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. These results are robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2009/wp-cesifo-2009-07/cesifo1_wp2699.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2699.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2699
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