On decentralization and life satisfaction
We empirically analyze the impact of fiscal and political decentralization on subjective well-being in a cross-section of 60,000 individuals from 66 countries. More spending or revenue decentralization raises well-being while greater local autonomy is beneficial only via government consumption spending.
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