How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate, national, and subnational government size?
Beyond conducting the usual regression analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and aggregate government size (national and subnational combined), this paper makes the first attempt to examine how different fiscal decentralization measures affect the sizes of national and subnational (state and local combined) governments. An econometric analysis using panel data from 32 industrial and developing countries, 1980¨C1994, finds that (1) expenditure decentralization leads to smaller national governments, larger subnational governments, and larger aggregate governments; (2) revenue decentralization increases subnational governments by less than it reduces national governments, hence leads to smaller aggregate governments; and (3) vertical imbalance tends to increase the sizes of subnational, national, and aggregate governments.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tao Zhang & Heng-fu Zou, 2001.
"Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and economic growth in China,"
CEMA Working Papers
58, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
- Zhang, Tao & Zou, Heng-fu, 1998. "Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and economic growth in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 221-240, February.
- Tao Zhang & Heng-fu Zou, 1996. "Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and economic growth in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1608, The World Bank.
- P.J. Grossman, 1988.
"Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size: An extension,"
Economics Discussion / Working Papers
88-16, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
- Philip Grossman, 1989. "Fiscal decentralization and government size: An extension," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 63-69, July.
- Philip J. Grossman, 1989. "Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size: An Extension," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-05, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Marlow, Michael L, 1991. "Privatization and Government Size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 273-76, January.
- Jan K. Brueckner, 2000.
"Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: The Effects of Local Corruption and Tax Evasion,"
Annals of Economics and Finance,
Society for AEF, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, May.
- Jan K. Brueckner, 1999. "Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: The Effects of Local Corruption and Tax Evasion," CEMA Working Papers 1, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics, revised Apr 2000.
- Nelson, Michael A, 1987. "Searching for Leviathan: Comment and Extension," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 198-204, March.
- Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 1980.
"The Power to Tax,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521233293, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:52:y:2002:i:2:p:270-293. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.