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Political Influence on the Central Bank : International Evidence

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  • Cukierman, A.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Webb, S.

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Suggested Citation

  • Cukierman, A. & Webb, S., 1994. "Political Influence on the Central Bank : International Evidence," Discussion Paper 1994-100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:1ab1ec96-2aa1-458f-9aec-c01648378286
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert J. Barro, 1991. "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 407-443.
    2. Stanley Fischer, 1991. "Growth, Macroeconomics, and Development," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Volume 6, pages 329-379, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    4. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    5. Cukierman, Alex & Edwards, Sebastian & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "Seigniorage and Political Instability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 537-555, June.
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