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La Autonomía del Banco Central una Vez Más

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  • Francisco Rosende

    (Instituto de Economía)

Abstract

This paper reviews recent developments on central banking. The first part discusses the "institutions irrelevance hypothesis" raised by Posen, among other economists. According to this view, the central bank independence (CBI) effectiveness as an arrangem

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Rosende, 1997. "La Autonomía del Banco Central una Vez Más," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 34(101), pages 3-26.
    • Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:34:y:1997:i:101:p:3-26
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    File URL: http://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/101rosea.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Castro Azócar, Felipe, 2021. "The future of the Central Bank and its autonomy in the Chilean Constitutional Convention," MPRA Paper 110173, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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