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Recent Central-Bank Reforms and the Role of Price Stability as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy

In: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10

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  • Carl E. Walsh

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  • Carl E. Walsh, 1995. "Recent Central-Bank Reforms and the Role of Price Stability as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 237-252 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:11020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-286, March.
    3. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-1070, December.
    4. Lars E.O. Svensson, 1993. "The Simplest Test of Inflation Target Credibility," NBER Working Papers 4604, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    6. José Viñals & Charles Goodhart, 1994. "Strategy and Tactics of Monetary Policy: Examples from Europe and the Antipodes," FMG Special Papers sp61, Financial Markets Group.
    7. Waller, Christopher J., 1992. "A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 411-428, June.
    8. Michael M. Hutchison, 1995. "Central bank credibility and disinflation in New Zealand," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue feb10.
    9. Charles Goodhart & José Viñals, 1994. "Strategy and Tactics of Monetary Policy: Examples from Europe and the Antipodes," Working Papers 9425, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    10. José I. García de Paso, 1993. "Monetary announcements and monetary policy credibility," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 17(3), pages 551-567, September.
    11. International Monetary Fund, 1991. "Central Bank Independence; Issues and Experience," IMF Working Papers 91/58, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Fratianni, M. & Von Hagen, J. & Waller, C., 1992. "The Maastricht Way to EMU," Princeton Studies in International Economics 187, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    13. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
    14. Guy Debelle, 1996. "The Ends of Three Small Inflations: Australia, New Zealand and Canada," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 22(1), pages 56-78, March.
    15. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
    16. Mark M. Spiegel, 1995. "Rules vs. discretion in New Zealand monetary policy," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue mar3.
    17. Andreas Fischer, 1993. "Inflation Targeting: The New Zealand and Canadian Cases," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 13(1), pages 1-27, Spring/Su.
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    Cited by:

    1. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
    2. Rao, Nasir Hamid & Bukhari, Syed Kalim Hyder, 2010. "Asymmetric Shocks and Co-movement of Price Indices," MPRA Paper 28723, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ibarra, Raul & Trupkin, Danilo R., 2016. "Reexamining the relationship between inflation and growth: Do institutions matter in developing countries?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PB), pages 332-351.
    4. Francisco Rosende, 1997. "La Autonomía del Banco Central una Vez Más," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 34(101), pages 3-26.
    5. Ibarra, Raul & Trupkin, Danilo R., 2016. "Reexamining the relationship between inflation and growth: Do institutions matter in developing countries?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PB), pages 332-351.
    6. Krause, Stefan & Méndez, Fabio, 2008. "Institutions, arrangements and preferences for inflation stability: Evidence and lessons from a panel data analysis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 282-307, March.
    7. Walsh, Carl E, 2003. " Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(5), pages 829-849, October.

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