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Signalling and Commitment: Monetary versus Inflation Targeting

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  • Gersbach, Hans
  • Hahn, Volker

Abstract

This Paper compares the social efficiency of monetary targeting and inflation targeting when central banks may have private information on shocks to money demand and, because of verifiability problems, the transparency solution is not feasible. Under inflation targeting and monetary targeting, central banks may have an incentive to signal their private information in order to influence the public's expectations about future inflation. We show that inflation targeting is superior to monetary targeting as it makes it easier for central banks to commit to low inflation. Moreover, central banks that are weak on inflation prefer inflation targeting to monetary targeting.

Suggested Citation

  • Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2003. "Signalling and Commitment: Monetary versus Inflation Targeting," CEPR Discussion Papers 4151, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4151
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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2008. "Forward Guidance for Monetary Policy: Is It Desirable?," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 08/84, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    2. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2011. "Monetary Policy Inclinations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(8), pages 1707-1717, December.
    3. Eijffinger, Sylvester & van der Cruijsen, Carin, 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 6070, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Meixing DAI, 2007. "A two-pillar strategy to keep inflation expectations at bay: A basic theoretical framework," Working Papers of BETA 2007-20, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    5. Meixing DAI, 2009. "On the role of money growth targeting under inflation targeting regime," Working Papers of BETA 2009-11, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    6. Sebastian Gomez-Barrero & Julian A. Parra-Polania, 2014. "Central Bank Strategic Forecasting," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(4), pages 802-810, October.
    7. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B., 2008. "The economic impact of central bank transparency," Other publications TiSEM 86c1ba91-1952-45b4-adac-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Dai, Meixing, 2007. "The design of a ‘two-pillar’ monetary policy strategy," MPRA Paper 14403, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2009.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central banks; Inflation targeting; Monetary targeting; Signalling; Commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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