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Strategic Discipline in Monetary Policy with Private Information: Optimal Targeting Horizons


  • Garfinkel, Michelle R
  • Oh, Seonghwan


This paper analyzes a multiperiod monetary targeting procedure as a possible resolution to the credibility problem in pol icy when the monetary authority has some private information. By limitin g the degree of flexibility permitted in policy, this procedure mitiga tes the credibility problem. As the length of the targeting horizon decreases, the severity of the credibility problem falls but at the expense of weakening the monetary authority's ability to pursue its stabilization goals. Based on model simulations, the analysis studi es the determinants of the optimal targeting horizon that balances the benefits of flexibility and discipline in policy. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Garfinkel, Michelle R & Oh, Seonghwan, 1993. "Strategic Discipline in Monetary Policy with Private Information: Optimal Targeting Horizons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 99-117, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:83:y:1993:i:1:p:99-117

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Fama, Eugene F., 1985. "What's different about banks?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-39, January.
    6. James Tobin, 1987. "Financial Intermediaries," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 817, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, 1989. "New Indexes of Coincident and Leading Economic Indicators," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1989, Volume 4, pages 351-409 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    9. Gilson, Stuart C. & John, Kose & Lang, Larry H. P., 1990. "Troubled debt restructurings*1: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 315-353, October.
    10. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1991. "Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60.
    11. Benjamin M. Friedman, 1981. "Debt and Economic Activity in the United States," NBER Working Papers 0704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Alan S. Blinder & Louis J. Maccini, 1991. "Taking Stock: A Critical Assessment of Recent Research on Inventories," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 73-96, Winter.
    13. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    14. Hoshi, Takeo & Kashyap, Anil & Scharfstein, David, 1990. "The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 67-88, September.
    15. King, Stephen R, 1986. "Monetary Transmission: Through Bank Loans or Bank Liabilities?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 18(3), pages 290-303, August.
    16. L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arayssi, Mahmoud, 2014. "Nominal Income and Inflation Targeting," MPRA Paper 62066, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Oh, Seonghwan, 1995. "When and how much to talk credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 341-357, April.
    3. Cukierman, A., 1996. "Targeting Monetary Aggregates and Inflation in Europe," Papers 37-96, Tel Aviv.
    4. Issing Otmar & Wieland Volker, 2013. "Monetary Theory and Monetary Policy: Reflections on the Development over the last 150 Years," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 233(3), pages 423-445, June.
    5. Philip Arestis & Luiz Fernando de Paula & Fernando Ferrari-Filho, 2006. "Inflation Targeting In Emerging Countries: The Case Of Brazil," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 42, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    6. Edward Kutsoati & Sharun Mukand, 2004. "Expectations and the Central Banker: Making Decisions the Market Expects to See? [revised]," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0418, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
    7. Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, March.
    8. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Way of Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 431-448, July.
    9. Arayssi, Mahmoud, 2015. "Transparent rules for deposing central bankers," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 1-17.
    10. Patrick Artus, 1995. "Effets internes et internationaux de l'indépendance des banques centrales," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(3), pages 857-867.
    11. Ugo Panizza, 1997. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers: Inflation versus Money Supply and Exchange Rate Targets," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 5-29, January.
    12. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2006. "Signaling And Commitment: Monetary Versus Inflation Targeting," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(05), pages 595-624, November.
    13. T. Christopher Canavan, 1995. "Can Ignorance Make Central Banks Behave?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 291., Boston College Department of Economics.

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