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The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey

  • Eijffinger, Sylvester C W
  • van der Cruijsen, Carin A B

We provide an up-to-date overview of the literature on the desirability of central bank transparency from an economic viewpoint. Since the move towards more transparency, a lot of research on its effects has been carried out. First, we show how the theoretical literature has evolved, by looking into branches inspired by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and by investigating several, more recent, research strands (e.g. coordination and learning). Then, we summarize the empirical literature which has been growing more recently. Last, we discuss whether: i) the empirical research resolves all theoretical question marks, ii) how the findings of the literature match the actual practice of central banks, and iii) where there is scope for more research.

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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6070
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