Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
This paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness. I show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group. But, group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare. Not publishing individuals' votes, raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare. If the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers, the incentive to build a reputation is greater, but expected social welfare may be higher or lower. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.
Volume (Year): 70 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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