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Does monetary policy transparency reduce disinflation costs?

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  • Georgios Chortareas
  • David Stasavage
  • Gabriel Sterne

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  • Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2003. "Does monetary policy transparency reduce disinflation costs?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 71(5), pages 521-540, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:71:y:2003:i:5:p:521-540
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-397, May.
    2. Chortareas, Georgios & Stasavage, David & Sterne, Gabriel, 2002. "Monetary Policy Transparency, Inflation and the Sacrifice Ratio," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(2), pages 141-155, April.
    3. Nickell, Stephen & Nunziata, Luca & Ochel, Wolfgang & Quintini, Glenda, 2001. "The Beveridge curve, unemployment and wages in the OECD from the 1960s to the 1990s - preliminary version," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20113, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Chortareas, Georgios E & Miller, Stephen M, 2003. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 271-295, September.
    5. Posen, Adam, 1998. "Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 335-359, July.
    6. Jensen, Henrik, 2002. " Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(3), pages 399-422, September.
    7. Forder, James, 1996. "On the Assessment and Implementation of 'Institutional' Remedies," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(1), pages 39-51, January.
    8. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, November.
    9. Lars Calmfors, 2001. "Wages and Wage-Bargaining Institutions in the Emu : A Survey of the Issues," CESifo Working Paper Series 520, CESifo Group Munich.
    10. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2002. "Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 99-118.
    11. W. Wascher & Palle S. Andersen, 1999. "Sacrifice ratios and the conduct of monetary policy in conditions of low inflation," BIS Working Papers 82, Bank for International Settlements.
    12. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
    13. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    14. Hasan Bakhshi & Anthony Yates, 1998. "Are UK inflation expectations rational?," Bank of England working papers 81, Bank of England.
    15. Dahl Christian M. & Hansen Niels L., 2001. "The Formation of Inflation Expectations under Changing Inflation Regimes," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(4), pages 1-31, January.
    16. Andreas Fischer, 1996. "Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 5-18, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carsten Hefeker & Michael Neugart, 2014. "The Influence of Central Bank Transparency on Labor Market Regulation," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(1), pages 17-32, January.
    2. Papadamou, Stephanos, 2013. "Market anticipation of monetary policy actions and interest rate transmission to US Treasury market rates," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 545-551.
    3. Petra M. Geraats, 2006. "Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 52(1), pages 111-152, March.
    4. Meade, Ellen E. & Stasavage, David, 2004. "Publicity of debate and the incentive to dissent: evidence from the US federal reserve," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19994, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Ana Lasaosa, 2007. "Learning the Rules of the New Game? Comparing the Reactions in Financial Markets to Announcements before and after the Bank of England's Operational Independence," Ekonomia, Cyprus Economic Society and University of Cyprus, vol. 10(1), pages 18-41, Summer.
    6. Bowdler, Christopher & Nunziata, Luca, 2010. "Labor market structures and the sacrifice ratio," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 816-826, September.
    7. van der Cruijsen, Carin & Demertzis, Maria, 2007. "The impact of central bank transparency on inflation expectations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 51-66, March.
    8. Petra M. Geraats, 2009. "Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 235-268, August.
    9. Iris Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal & Peter Howells, 2007. "Monetary Policy Transparency in the UK: The Impact of Independence and Inflation Targeting," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(5), pages 603-617.
    10. EllenE. Meade & David Stasavage, 2008. "Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 695-717, April.
    11. Carin van der Cruijsen & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2007. "The economic impact of central bank transparency: a survey," DNB Working Papers 132, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    12. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    13. Iris Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal & Peter Howells, 2007. "Central bank communication, transparency and interest rate volatility: Evidence from the USA," Working Papers 0704, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol.
    14. Petra M. Geraats, 2008. "ECB Credibility and Transparency," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 330, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    15. Adonias Evaristo Costa Filho & Fabiana Rocha, 2008. "Comunicação e política monetária no Brasil," Working Papers 08_17, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto.
    16. da Costa Filho, Adonias Evaristo & Rocha, Fabiana, 2009. "Comunicação e política monetária no Brasil," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 63(4), December.
    17. Petra Geraats, 2014. "Monetary Policy Transparency," CESifo Working Paper Series 4611, CESifo Group Munich.
    18. Runchana Pongsaparn & Panda Ketruangroch & Dhanaporn Hirunwong, 2012. "Monetary Policy conduct in Review: The Appropriate Choice of Instruments," Working Papers 2012-05, Monetary Policy Group, Bank of Thailand.
    19. Iris Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal & Peter Howells, 2005. "Monetary Policy Transparency and Uncertainty: A Comparison between the Bank of England and the Bundesbank/ECB," Working Papers 0508, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol.
    20. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B., 2008. "The economic impact of central bank transparency," Other publications TiSEM 86c1ba91-1952-45b4-adac-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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